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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 
) 2014CV253094 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------------------) 
PIEDMONTfMAPLE, LLC, KAUFMAN 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LP, and 
CRAIG S. KAUFMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DAVID EICHENBLATT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS, MOTION TO EXCLUDE OPINION 
INFORMATION AND TESTIMONY, AND MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID L. EICHENBLATT 
This matter is before the COUli on (1) Plaintiffs' Piedmont/Maple, LLC, Kaufman 
Development Partners, LP ("KDP") and Craig S. Kaufman's (collectively as "Plaintiffs") Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude 
Opinion Information and Testimony of Ronald A. Neyhart ("Neyhart") and David L. Eichenblatt 
("Eichenblatt"); and (3) Motion to Strike Affidavit of David L. Eichenblatt. After consideration 
of the motions, briefs submitted, and oral arguments the COUli finds as follows: 
I. Undisputed Facts 
In 1995, KDpl and Eichenblatt formed Piedmont/Maple, LLC ("PiedmontlMaple") to 
own and operate commercial real estate located between Piedmont Road and Maple Drive in 
Buckhead. KDP and Eichenblatt were the only two members ofPiedmont/Maple-KDP held a 
60% share and Eichenblatt held a 40% share. Piedmont/Maple owned property fronting Maple 
I Craig S. Kaufman was the President of Kaufman Realty Group, Inc. ("KRG"), which is the sole general partner of 
KDP. Kaufman signed both the Separation Agreement and Operating Agreement on behalf of KDP as the President 
ofKRG. 
Drive (the "Maple Parcel") and adjoining property fronting Piedmont Road (the "Piedmont 
Parcel"). The Maple Parcel included two three-story office buildings and a restaurant, while the 
Piedmont Parcel consisted of a four-story office building. Collectively, the parcels were known 
as Piedmont COUlt. 
In 1999, KDP and Eichenblatt ended their business relationship and removed Eichenblatt 
as a member of Piedmont/Maple. The patties memorialized their decision by amending 
Piedmont/Maple's Operating Agreement and by executing a Separation Agreement. Section 19 
of the Separation Agreement states that: 
[T]he parties acknowledge and hereby consent to David [Eichenblatt]'s removal 
as a Member of Piedmont/Maple as of December 31, 1999 pursuant to Section 
3.1(ai of the Operating Agreement which provides that once David is removed as 
a Member he shall continue to have the right to receive such share of allocations 
and distributions to which he would otherwise be entitled, but shall have no other 
powers, rights or privileges of a Member of Piedmont/Maple. 
Section 12(a) of the Separation Agreement states that KRG, a company affiliated with Kaufman 
and KDP, could lease office space at 3098 Piedmont Road, Suite 490 under the following terms: 
[M]onthly rent commencing January 1,2000 shall be $6,549.33 based on 4,912 
square feet presently leased, with such rental being increased each calendar year 
thereafter by an amount equal to three and one-half (3.5%) percent of the prior 
year's monthly rent ... [KRG] shall have the right to cause its office space to be 
remeasured according to BOMA standards and such measurement shall serve as 
the basis for which the rent is determined. 
The 2000 Lease Agreement charged $16 per square foot for 4,912 square feet. 
2 Section 3.1 (a) of the Operating Agreement states that: 
A Member removed as provided herein shall have the right to receive such share 
of allocations and distributions to which such Member would otherwise be 
entitled, but shall have no other powers, rights or privileges of a Member of the 
Company. 
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The First Amendment to Operating Agreement of Piedmont/Maple, LLC, Paragraph 1, 
memorialized Eichenblatt's removal and stated "Eichenblatt shall have the right to receive such 
share of allocations and distributions to which he would otherwise be entitled, but shall have no 
other powers, rights or privileges of a Member of the Company" and reiterated that Eichenblatt 
would have no vote in any matter requiring approval of the Members. Paragraph 2.10 gave 
Piedmont/Maple permission to "enter into transactions with any Member, or with any affiliate of 
any Member ... " so long as "the price and other terms of such transactions or compensation for 
services are fair to [Piedmont/Maple] and are not less favorable to [PiedmontlMaple] than those 
generally prevailing with respect to comparable transactions or compensation for services 
between unrelated parties." 
As the sole member of Piedmont/Maple, KDP had "the right, power and authority on 
behalf of [Piedmont/Maple] and in its name to execute documents or other instruments and 
exercise all of the rights, powers and authority of [Piedmont/Maple]." Section 2.4(a). Further, 
KDP, as the sole member with voting interest, could undertake major decisions such as 
"approval of any refinancing of the Project or any sale or other disposition of any substantial part 
of the Project or the Company's assets." Section 2.4(b)(vii). 
In 2005, Piedmont/Maple refinanced existing debt on both the Maple Parcel and 
Piedmont Parcel through Column Financial, Inc. ("Column"). Piedmont/Maple formed two 
separate legal sub-entities to operate the respective parcels: Piedmont Road, LLC to own/operate 
the Piedmont Parcel and Maple Drive, LLC to own/operate the Maple Parcel. Column provided 
a loan of $3.5 million to Maple Drive, LLC (the "Maple Note") with an interest rate of 5.61 % 
per annum and a separate loan for $3.3 million to Piedmont Road, LLC (the "Piedmont Note") at 
the same interest rate. 
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In 2009, Eichenblatt filed suit against KDP and others, raising claims of breach of 
contract and breach of fiduciary duties. David Eichenblatt v. Craig S. Kaufman, et al., No. 
2009cv175140 (Fulton Cnty Sup. Ct.). According to the allegations of the Second Amended 
Verified Complaint, Kaufman and KDP mismanaged Piedmont Court and breached the 
Piedmont/Maple Operating Agreement by splitting the property in two with separate financing 
and by refusing to sell the entire Piedmont Court property from 2005 to 2007 despite 
Eichenblatt's pleas to do so. Eichenblatt alleged Kaufman and KDP let the Piedmont Note go 
into default in July 2009 and KDP secretly purchased the Piedmont Note at a discount at auction. 
Then, Kaufman and KDP caused Piedmont/Maple to purchase the indebtedness through three 
notes with higher interest rates. Eichenblatt asserted that the refinancing of the loans at the 
higher interest rate effectively wiped out Eichenblatt's financial interest in the property. The 
Complaint alleged KDP breached the Operating Agreement by not dissolving Piedmont/Maple 
when the property was split. Eichenblatt also alleged Kaufman underpaid rent and failed to 
provide financial statements in violation of the Separation Agreement. On September 8, 2011, a 
jury found that KDP (but not Kaufman) breached the Operating Agreement and awarded 
Eichenblatt $625,000 in compensatory damages. The jury also found Kaufman breached the 
Separation Agreement but awarded no damages for the breach of the Separation Agreement. 
The basis of the jury's award is not clear. 
In 2011, the Maple Parcel lost a major tenant and Plaintiffs were unable to re-lease the 
vacant office space. The Maple Note eventually went into default and KDP began to market the 
Maple Parcel for sale while it attempted to renegotiate the terms of the Maple Note. Kaufman 
testified that he believed the highest and best use for the Maple Parcel was for multi-family 
redevelopment and thus he chose to market the Maple Parcel separate from the recently 
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renovated office building on the Piedmont Parcel. Two different developers were under contract 
to purchase the Maple Parcel, in November 2011 and April 2012, but these contracts were 
terminated. After nine months without any payments on the Maple Note, Column declined to 
restructure the loan and informed Plaintiffs it planned to auction off the loan. 
Ultimately, to avoid foreclosure, KDP paid off the Maple Note plus penalties and default 
interest and caused Piedmont/Maple to enter into a promissory note payable to KDP (the 
"September 2012 Note") for $3,550,000. The September 2012 Note carried an interest rate of 
15% and set two fmancing fees payable to a related entity, KRG, totaling $71,000. Two months 
before this September 2012 Note was provided, Alliance Realty Partners ("Alliance") went 
under contract with Plaintiffs to purchase the Maple Parcel for $5.5 million. Alliance eventually 
closed on the Maple Parcel months later in April 2013. 
Eichenblatt did not receive any distributions as a result of the sale of the Maple Parcel. 
The Piedmont Parcel was not included with the sale of the Maple Parcel but instead was sold 
separately in November of2013 for $5.525 million. After the sale of the Maple Parcel and the 
Piedmont Parcel, Piedmont/Maple was dissolved. 
Plaintiffs initiated this declaratory judgment suit seeking to establish they correctly 
calculated Eichenblatt's 40% share of Piedmont/Maple after its dissolution in 2013. Eichenblatt, 
in response, has asserted three counterclaims: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
attorneys' fees. The breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims are based on the 
same actions: (1) allowing the Maple Note to go into default and replacing it with a higher 
interest rate loan from KDP with associated finance fees paid to KRG; (2) marketing Piedmont 
Court as two separate parcels at a discounted price instead of as an assemblage; and (3) failing to 
charge KRG the proper rent. 
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II. Standard of Review 
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). A party may do this by "showing the court the documents, affidavits, 
depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a 
jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case." Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 
623-24 (2010); Scarborough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 829 (1999). To avoid summary 
judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code section, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(e). The Court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 
Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996). "[M]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility [are] insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011); see Pafford v. Biomet, 
264 Ga. 540, 544 (1994) (finding mere speculation did not give rise to a genuine issue of 
material fact). 
III. Breach of Contract 
Eichenblatt alleges KDP breached the Operating Agreement and Separation Agreement 
by failing to perform its duties under these contracts in good faith and by engaging in self- 
dealing. In Georgia, the elements for a breach of contract claim are the breach and the resultant 
damages to the party having the right to complain about the contract being broken. Dewrell 
Sacks, LLP v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 324 Ga. App. 219, 223 (2013) (citations omitted). "There 
is also a common law duty to diligently and in good faith seek to comply with all portions of the 
terms of a contract." Stuart Enters. Int'l, Inc. v. Peykan, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 231, 233(2) (2001). 
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However, a breach of the covenant of good faith in the performance of a contract cannot form the 
basis of an independent cause of action apart from breach of contract. Id. at 234(2) (affirming 
trial court's j .n.o. v where jury found breach of implied covenant of good faith but no breach of 
contract). In other words, one party must have a contractual obligation to another party in order 
to prevail on a claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Onbrand 
Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 141, 147 (2009). 
"[W]here the manner of performance is left more or less to the discretion of one of the 
parties to the contract, he is bound to the exercise of good faith." Camp v. Peetluk, 262 Ga. App. 
345,350 (2003) (quoting Rogers v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 247 Ga. App. 631,633 (2001)). 
"The question of good faith is generally for the jury." Id. However, "it is possible to so draw a 
contract as to leave decisions absolutely to the uncontrolled discretion of one of the parties and in 
such a case the issue of good faith is irrelevant. MacDougald Const. Co. v. State Highway Dep 't, 
125 Ga. App. 591, 594 (1972) (citing VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., D.C., 303 
F.Supp. 773)). "If an agreement by its express terms grants a party absolute or uncontrolled 
discretion in making a decision, then no duty of good faith is implied as to that decision." 
Hunting Aircraft, Inc. v. Peachtree City Airport Auth., 281 Ga. App. 450, 453 (2006). 
a. Allowing Maple Note to Go Into Default and Extending Member Loan 
Eichenblatt claims KDP breached the Operating Agreement by deciding not to pay the 
Maple Note and allowing it to go into default in order to give itself a strategic opportunity to 
provide a member loan-the September 2012 Note-that would generate finance fees for KRG 
(the General Partner of KDP) while ensuring that Eichenblatt would not receive any 
distributions. The evidence presented shows the Maple Parcel was not generating enough rental 
income to meet its debt payments, and KDP pursued two different strategies to save as much 
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value of the Maple Parcel as possible-seeking to restructure the Maple Note with the lender and 
marketing the Maple Parcel for sale. There is no evidence Maple Drive, LLC had the ability to 
pay the Maple Note and refused to do so. 
Nor is there any evidence that the terms of the September 2012 Note were unfair. 
Eichenblatt claims the September 2012 Note was unfair on its face because the interest rate KDP 
charged was higher than the Maple Note's interest rate and contained financing fees payable to 
KRG. Section 2.10 of the First Amended Operating Agreement allows Piedmont/Maple to: 
[E]nter into transactions with any Member, or any affiliate of any Member. .. 
provided that the price and other terms of such transactions or compensation for 
services are fair to the Company and are not less favorable to the Company than 
those generally prevailing with respect to comparable transactions or 
compensation for services between unrelated parties. 
Under this provision, Piedmont/Maple was free to accept a member loan from KDP as long as 
the terms were no less favorable than the terms would have been with a loan obtained from an 
unrelated party. There is no contractual requirement that KDP lend money to Piedmont/Maple 
on the same or better terms as a prior loan. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the member loan was 
made at or better than market terms and that the interest rate and fees were aligned with the 
market rate for the type of risk of in question. Eichenblatt has not submitted any evidence that 
Piedmont/Maple could have obtained a loan from an unrelated party with more favorable terms 
at the time when the September 2012 Note was issued. As such, this theory fails to establish the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Eichenblatt argues KDP should have made a capital contribution as required by the 
Operating Agreement instead of the loan. The Operating Agreement gives KDP, as the sole 
member of Pied mont/Ma pie, the "right, power and authority" to act on behalf of the Company. 
Section 2.4(a) (emphasis added). Further, 
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(a) KDP shall be obligated to contribute $1,500,000 to the capital of the 
Company. KDP shall contribute such portions of its required capital contribution 
pursuant to this Section 4.1 (a) as and when called for by the Company. The 
Company shall call for contributions by KDP pursuant to this Section 4.1 (a) at 
such times and in such amounts as are approved by Members owning at least a 
Majority of the Voting Interests of the Members. 
(b) In addition to the required capital contributions under Section 4.1 (a), 
KDP shall be obligated to contribute to the capital of the Company, to lend to the 
Company on such terms as are agreed to by the Company and KDP, or to 
guarantee a loan of the Company from a third party in an aggregate amount up to 
$500,000. Any call for capital contributions, loans, or guarantees by KDP 
pursuant to this Section 4.1 (b) shall be made at such times and in such amounts as 
are approved by Members owning at least a Majority of the Voting Interests of the 
Members. 
Section 4.I(a) & (b). 
The evidence shows KDP made an initial capital contribution of $1.5 million that was 
subsequently repaid. Thus, KDP satisfied its contractually obligations under Section 4.I(a). 
Section 4.1 (b) gives Piedmont/Maple several funding options at such times and in such amounts 
as approved by the voting members. KDP, as the sole voting member and the only entity with 
the "right, power and authority" to act on behalf of Piedmont/Maple, chose to extend a $3.55 
million loan to avoid auction of the Maple Parcel. The express terms of the Operating 
Agreement does not create a contractual duty for KDP to choose a different funding option 
simply because it would benefit Eichenblatt's own financial interest. See WirelessMl), Inc. v. 
Healthcare.com Corp., 271 Ga. App. 461,468 (2005) (affirming summary judgment on breach 
of implied covenant of good faith claim and finding buyer of rights to software had no obligation 
to market software even though seller was to share in profits). 
Eichenblatt's hypothesizes there were two other alternatives to default and the September 
2012 Note. First, Eichenblatt hypothesizes Piedmont/Maple could have used cash generated by 
the Piedmont Parcel to pay the Maple Note. However, the evidence shows the Maple Parcel 
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were split from the Piedmont Parcel in 2005 so that one property would not be encumbered by 
the debts of the other. To the extent Eichenblatt is complaining about these parcels being split 
between two separate entities, Maple Drive, LLC and Piedmont Road, LLC, those arguments 
were adjudicated in the prior suit and are therefore foreclosed. 
Second, Eichenblatt hypothesizes that $1.4 million borrowed in August of 20 11 from 
State Bank to payoff the notes on the Piedmont Parcel could have been used instead to renovate 
the office space on the Maple Parcel which he again speculates would have attracted a new 
tenant. However, there is no evidence that State Bank would have authorized PiedmontlMaple to 
use the mortgage financing extended to and secured by the Piedmont Parcel, which by that time 
was generating cash flow from long term tenants, for the purpose of renovating the Maple Parcel 
or that they would have extended a separate loan for that purpose. There is no evidence of an 
interested tenant for the Maple Parcel or that renovations would have attracted such a tenant:. 
Without cash flow, the Maple Note would still have been in default. In other words, there is only 
conjecture that these options were viable alternatives to default and conjecture is insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011). 
As such, the motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim under 
this theory is GRANTED. 
b. Independent Sale of Maple Parcel 
Eichenblatt is foreclosed from arguing that dividing the Piedmont Court property into 
separate parcels owned by separate subsidiaries of Piedmont/Maple in 2005 caused the property 
to lose value. He made this argument in the prior case and received a judgment in his favor. "A 
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same patties and 
their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in 
10 
Piedmont/Maple, LLC et at. v. Eichenblatt; CAFN 2014cv253094; Order on (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaims, (2) Motion to Exclude Opinion, and (3) Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
David L. Eichenblatt. 
issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set 
aside." O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40. In the previous lawsuit between the same parties, Eichenblatt 
sought damages relating to Plaintiffs' decision to divide the parcels in two and Plaintiffs' delay 
in selling the Piedmont Parcel and Maple Parcel as an assemblage. See, e.g., Amended 
Complaint ~ 22 ("By splitting up the Piedmont Court commercial buildings into two subsidiaries, 
Kaufman drastically jeopardized the value of the Piedmont Court property, and also created 
potentially serious financing issues."); ~~ 39-41 ("While Kaufman stated that the property should 
be sold, Kaufman made no serious effort to sell the property. By the time property was listed, 
the window of opportunity to sell was all but closed. Kaufman wasted valuable time trying to 
buy Eichenblatt's interest in the property at a grossly undervalued price and false statements of 
ability to sell, instead of offering a fair price or listing the Piedmont Court property. By the time 
it was listed, it could not effectively be sold."). At closing arguments in the prior trial, counsel 
for Eichenblatt argued that a combined parcel sale would have netted between $17 million and 
$25 million, and thus Eichenblatt's share (after paying commissions, mortgages, and lender fees) 
would have been worth $4 to 6.7 million. In this lawsuit, Eichenblatt again seeks damages to his 
own bottom line because KDP failed to sell the assemblage for between $18.5 million and $21 
million arguing in his Counterclaim that his 40% interest would have been $ 4 million based on a 
sale for $21 million. Eichenblatt seeks the same damages here as were at issue in the previous 
lawsuit between the same parties-what distributions could have been possible had KDP sold at 
top value as an assemblage-and as such res judicata applies. 
The motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim under this 
theory is GRANTED. 
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c. Failure to Collect Rent 
Finally, Eichenblatt contends KDP committed a breach of contract by failing to collect 
the contractually required rent from KRG. Section 12(a) of the Separation Agreement states that, 
for a lease at the office space located at 3098 Piedmont Road, Suite 490: 
[M]onthly rent commencing January 1,2000 shall be $6,549.33 based on 4,912 
square feet presently leased, with such rental being increased each calendar year 
thereafter by an amount equal to three and one-half (3.5%) percent of the prior 
year's monthly rent ... [KRG] shall have the right to cause its office space to be 
remeasured according to BOMA standards and such measurement shall serve as 
the basis for which the rent is determined. 
The 2000 rental rate for KRG was $16 per square foot for 4,912 square feet. The Lease was 
modified eight times. By the Seventh Amendment effective January 1, 2009 through August 31, 
2009, the square footage for Suite 490 was reduced to 2,000 square feet but the price per square 
foot remained at $16. By the Eighth Amendment effective September 1,2009 and continuing 
month to month, the rental rate remained the same. KDP failed to increase the rent by 3.5% of 
the prior year's monthly rent, as required under the Separation Agreement. As such, the COUli 
finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether KDP committed a breach of 
contract by undercharging rent. Though KDP argues the claim is barred by res judicata, the prior 
case sought uncollected rent before 2009. Eichenblatt now seeks damages for failure to charge 
the proper rent from January 1,2010 through the termination ofKRG's Lease. The motion for 
summary judgment on the breach of contract counterclaim under this theory is DENIED. 
IV. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
"Establishing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) 
the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach ofthat duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by 
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the breach." Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Cook, 332 Ga. App. 834,842 (2015), cert. denied (Oct. 
5,2015) (citations omitted). 
Here, there is evidence sufficient for a factfinder to find a fiduciary relationship between 
Eichenblatt and KDP and Eichenblatt and Kaufman. A fiduciary duty arises "where one party is 
so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or 
where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, 
such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc." O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58. 
Though Eichenblatt gave up his membership interest in Piedmont/Maple, he retained an 
equitable interest. Thus, a factfinder could find KDP as sole member owed a duty to Eichenblatt. 
Similarly, there is evidence that Kaufman was making all the decisions as to the business and 
affairs of Pied montl Maple on behalf ofKDP as President ofKPD's general partner, KRG. This 
evidence creates an issue of fact as to duty owed by Kaufman and KDP. See Cushing v. Cohen, 
323 Ga. App. 497, 508(5) (2013) (citing Jennings v. Smith, 226 Ga. App. 765, 766(1) (1997)) 
("[A]n officer of a corporation who participates or cooperates in a tortious act may be personally 
liable for resulting damages" and whether fiduciary duty exists is "generally a factual matter for 
the jury to resolve."). 
Assuming both KDP and Kaufman owed fiduciary duties to Eichenblatt, the Court turns 
to the breaches alleged. Eichenblatt repeats the same theories of alleged wrongdoing discussed 
above in support of his breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim against both KDP and Kaufman. 
"When a fiduciary relationship exists, the agent may not make a profit for himself out of the 
relationship to the injury of the principal." Wright v. Apartment lnv. & Mgmt. Co., 315 Ga. App. 
587,594 (2012). However, actions specifically permitted by the agreement cannot constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty. See Bumgarner v. Green, 227 Ga. App. 156,158 (1997); Conner v. 
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Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 96 (2001) ("Because Hart was expressly authorized to sell the Alpharetta 
store, his attempt to do so cannot constitute a breach of fiduciary duty."). Here, there is a 
genuine issue as to whether KDP and Kaufman undercharged rent to KRG in order to benefit the 
interests of Kaufman, his family, and related entities to the detriment of Eichenblatt's 40% 
interest in Piedmont/Maple. As such, summary judgment on Defendant's breach of fiduciary 
duty counterclaim under this theory is DENIED. 
As noted above, KDP was expressly permitted to loan money to Piedmont/Maple under 
the Operating Agreement. KDP and Kaufman cannot be said to breach its fiduciary duties to 
Eichenblatt by rescuing Piedmont/Maple from an auction of the Maple Parcel through entering 
into the September 2012 Note. 
Finally, the issue of whether Kaufman and KDP breached their fiduciary duties to 
Eichenblatt for failing to market the parcels as an assemblage is barred by res judicata. As such, 
summary judgment on Defendant's breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim under these theories is 
GRANTED. 
V. Attorneys' Fees 
Claims for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation are generally for the fact finder, not 
the trial court upon summary adjudication. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. As such, Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Defendant's counterclaim for attorneys' fees is DENIED. 
VI. Motion to Exclude Opinion Information and Testimony of Ronald A. Neyhart 
and David L. Eichenblatt. 
Plaintiffs seek to exclude the expert opinion of Eichenblatt's appraiser, Neyhart, and 
Eichenblatt's own opinion as to the value ofthe parcels if sold as an assemblage. As the claim 
relating to selling the parcels as an assemblage has been dismissed on summary judgment as res 
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judicata, the testimony Plaintiffs seek to exclude as to the value of the parcels as an assemblage 
is no longer relevant. Thus, the Motion to Exclude Opinion Information and Testimony of 
Neyhart and Eichenblatt is GRANTED. 
VII. Motion to Strike Affidavit of David L. Eichenblatt 
Plaintiffs seek to strike Eichenblatt's affidavit which was submitted to the Court on the 
eve of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing the affidavit is immaterial and 
consists of improper and inadmissible opinion testimony. To the extent the affidavit provides his 
opinion as to the value of the property as an assemblage that opinion is no longer relevant to the 
surviving claims. Eichenblatt may submit his calculation of the underpaid rent charged to KRG. 
Thus, the Motion to Strike Affidavit of David L. Eichenblatt is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this d ct day of October, 2016. 
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